International Outsourcing effects on labor markets are mostly analyzed within flexible wage settings. Using a modern duality approach, this paper formally investigates differences 
Introduction
Within the last decade, a huge area of theoretical as well as empirical literature emerged investigating implications of International Outsourcing. Most of these contributions assume flexible wage economies. With respect to labor market rigidities, that typically characterize major European economies, only few theoretical contributions emerged recently. However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence. This manuscript tries to contribute to fill this gap. Therefore, it formally analyzes the implications of low skilled wage rigidity on general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing and provides this fields first empirical evidence: When industries are characterized by sticky wages for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing increases the wage gap between low and high skilled labor less extensively. This, however, has to be bought dearly with an increase in low skilled unemployment.
Concerning labor market effects of International Outsourcing in a flexible wage economies, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) very early show that International Outsourcing increases the relative wage of high skilled labor on a more aggregated industry level in both, the insourcing (developing) as well as the outsourcing (developed) economy. Within a series of papers, Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1998a investigates general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing at more disaggregated industry levels. Since producers shed their less competitive production blocks to become more efficient competitors on world markets, International Outsourcing has different effects depending on the relative skill intensity of the outsourcing industry. When taking place in the relative low skill intensive industry, International Outsourcing increases relative wages of the low skilled, and decreases them when taking place in the relative high skill intensive industry. Since the outsourcing industry gets more competitive on world markets, it increases output while the other industry, the one remaining integrated, contracts. Focusing on the implications on innovation, Glass and Saggi (2001) show that International Outsourcing decreases relative wages but increases the pace of innovation and therefore, accelerates the progression of the technology frontier. Deardorff (2001a,b) shows within a combination of a Ricardian and a Heckscher-Ohlin model, that adjustment effects of International Outsourcing depend on the factor intensities of the relocated production blocks. Egger and Falkinger (2003) focus on distributional effects of International Outsourcing. Considering different modes of final goods production, they investigate factor price consequences of International Outsourcing in several equilibrium situations. More recently, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) present a simple paradigm investigating consequences of what they call "task-trade" on prices, resource allocation, and welfare. Arguing in terms of factor augmenting technical changes, a decline in the costs of task trade directly boosts the productivity of the respective factor. Kohler (2008) presents a unified framework in order to explain the differences of the factor vs. the sector bias of International Outsourcing. His results show that the implications depend strongly on the shock that induces offshore sourcing (a reduction in factor costs of delocalization on the one hand or a change in prices for the tradable final good on the other hand). Thus, Kohler illuminates the huge importance of being explicit in this respect in order to avoid joint endogeneity of International Outsourcing with employment or wage effects.
In more recent recent years, economic literature started to consider labor market imperfections as well, not at least in an attempt to better fit the theoretical results to empirical findings as observed e.g. in the major European economies. There, due to powerful unions and high social standards, labor markets are characterized by rigid wages for low skilled labor. Violating the typically posed flexible wage assumption and introducing different forms of wage rigidity, results of the impact of International Outsourcing on labor are likely to change. As Krugman (1995) illuminates, trade implications differ fundamentally between a European case (assuming wage rigidity) and an American one (assuming flexible wages): With wage rigidity, a decrease in the production of the low skill intensive good leads to an increase of low skilled unemployment.
Even if the effects of wage rigidities are well known since the discussion in Brecher (1974a,b) , 1 theoretical investigations analyzing the effects with respect to International
Outsourcing activities are still rare.
Skaksen (2004) (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and introducing a fair-wage approach (see Solow, 1979; Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, 1990 ) to focus on a special form of labor market imperfection, Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) present a model where wage inequality is able to coexists with unemployment. Thus, using a novel diagrammatic tool (based on the Lerner-Pearce diagram), they are able to address major public concerns of International Outsourcing: With high skill intensive home production, International
Outsourcing mitigates the unemployment problem and reduces the high skill wage premium. Additionally, they explore how preferences with respect to fair wages and the size of employment benefits govern employment effects.
When leaving the theoretical world and studying the empirical literature, there is no contribution examining the differences in labor market implications occurring when
International Outsourcing takes place in industries characterized by a rigid wage floor.
Since there is a lack of macro-variables indicating the degree of an industry's labor market inflexibility, the necessary information needs to be generated. This statistical problem, however, may be the reason for the lack of empirical evidence testing the few theoretical results which recently emerged in this field of research. This paper tries to contribute to fill this gap.
Therefore, it first provides a formal model investigating how general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing change if flexible wages are displaced by rigid wages for low skilled labor. In order to fit into the recently emerged discussion of the importance of the sector vs. the factor bias of International Outsourcing, the model assumes two sectors with two primary inputs of labor. Section 2 introduces the basic framework. Using Shephard's Lemma (cf. Shephard, 1953 , 1970 and following the line of Uzawa (1964) , Diewert (1971 , 1974 ), Woodland (1977 , and Mussa (1979) , the model builds on the modern duality approach in international trade theory. In order to achieve the flexible wage benchmark model, Section 3 introduces International
Outsourcing similar to skill biased technical change as defined in Jones (1965) and analyzes the occurring implications for general equilibrium. In Section 4, the flexible wage assumption is violated by introducing wage rigidity for low skilled labor as in Brecher (1974a,b) . As it turns out, results differ fundamentally from the flexible wage approach. When International Outsourcing takes place in the relative high skill intensive industry, relative wages of the high skilled still increase, however, not as strong as in the flexible wage scenario. In order to keep production positive, and to maintain the minimum cost level, the relative low skill intensive industry has to reduce output. This additional reduction in output forces the industry to set low skilled labor free. Since not all of these workers can be absorbed by the expanding relative high skill intensive industry, International Outsourcing increases unemployment of the low skilled as we move down the Rybczynski line towards the new equilibrium situation. 
Theoretical Framework
In order to formally investigate equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing, this section uses the modern duality approach in international trade theory. Based upon an algebraic simplicity known as Shephard's Lemma, equilibrium conditions in the production sector are formulated in terms of unit cost functions rather than production functions. Following the line of Uzawa (1964) , Diewert (1971 Diewert ( , 1974 , Woodland (1977) , and Mussa (1979) , this leads to a cost minimization problem in a factor-price space.
The advantage of minimizing unit costs rather than maximizing output can be derived from Shephard (1953 Shephard ( , 1970 : With unit cost functions differentiable at the factor price w * , the cost minimizing input-output-coefficients can simply be obtained with the partial derivative of the unit cost functions with respect to wages.
Consider an economy facing given world prices p with two industries, a relative high skill intensive (X) and a relative low skill intensive one (Y). Both industries use two primary inputs, low skilled labor L and high skilled labor H to produce goods of quantity q i (with i = X, Y). The production function is of a typical Cobb Douglas kind with constant returns to scale. Goods as well as factor markets are perfectly competitive with factors mobile between industries, but immobile between countries. The home country faces an inelastic supply of labor (L,H) and remains incompletely specialized (q i > 0). In order to keep the model traceable, we focus on the supply side of the economy in setting the elasticity of demand unity (σ D = 1). Thus, the world market is assumed to absorb changes in demand and, sincep = 0, possible effects from price changes. Thus, with free entry in both industries, we achieve the unit cost functions equaling the price
with c i as unit costs, a i j as unit factor requirements ( j = L, H), w j as factor prices, the price of the relative low skill intensive good Y as numeraire, and the relative price of good X as p ≡ p X /p Y . When partially differentiating the unit cost functions with respect to the wages (Shepard's Lemma), we achieve
as cost minimizing labor unit requirements. Additionally, we have to consider
as labor market equilibrium conditions. Thus, we have a system of eight endogenous variables (w H , w L , a XL , a XH , a YL , a YH , q X , and q Y ) in eight equations (1) - (8) that exactly determine the model.
General Equilibrium Effects of International

Outsourcing: The Benchmark Model
In order to enable the industries relocating their production fragments abroad, we define ϕ i j as an International Outsourcing parameter, similar to skill biased technical change as defined in Jones (1965) . Since International Outsourcing is assumed to reduce labor unit requirements, the percentage changeφ
is a measure showing the alteration in a i j due to International Outsourcing activities (IO) that would take place at constant wages.
2 Thus, we have to rewrite the unit cost functions (1) and (2) into
with w j ≡ w j ϕ ij and a i j ≡ ϕ i j a i j as wages and labor unit requirements considering International Outsourcing activities. To minimize unit costs, (9) and (10) are totally differentiated in order to obtain
as equilibrium production in both industries with factor income shares θ i j ≡ a ij w j p i and "hats" over variables denoting percentage changes. As (11) and (12) show, in principle, there are four International Outsourcing situations: Both industries can either outsource their low skill intensive or their high skill intensive production block.
In order to keep the focus on analyzing the changes of International Outsourcing implications occurring in rigid wage industries, it is sufficient to consider only the International Outsourcing situation, in which the high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill intensive production fragments. 3 Thus, withφ (11) and (12) change to
Wages and Labor Unit Requirements
To examine the effects of International Outsourcing on wages, we can solve (13) and (14) for the change in low and high skilled wages and obtain
with ∆ Θ as the determinant of the matrix of factor income shares Θ ≡
3 As known from the sector bias of International Outsourcing (cf. Arndt, 1997 Arndt, , 1998a , low skilled wages increase if International Outsourcing takes place in the relative low skill intensive industry.
Thus, a possible downward wage rigidity for low skilled labor would not be binding. Since the relative high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill intensive production block, it needs less low skilled labor to produce one unit of commodity X. As the economy faces given world prices, this induces a reduction of unit costs. Thus, the respective unit cost curve shifts horizontally outward. Since relative wages of the high skilled increase in both industries, high skilled labor gains from this International Outsourcing activity in receiving a wage premium.
As we know from Shephard's Lemma (3) -(6), equilibrium labor unit requirements can be obtained by differentiating the unit cost functions partially with respect to the wages. Considering International Outsourcing (
as the percentage change of the cost minimizing labor unit requirements. Now consider that onlyφ XL > 0 and substitute for the change in relative wages (17) we
as the percentage change of relative labor unit requirements. Since International
Outsourcing increases relative wages of the high skilled, relative labor unit requirements of the high skilled decrease in both industries. Thus, both industries shift skill requirements toward more low skilled labor.
4
Output and Employment
To investigate the effects of International Outsourcing on output, take the total differential of the full employment conditions (7) and (8). In equilibrium, we obtain
. Substituting for the changes of labor unit requirements and relative wages we can solve these equations for the percentage change in output of both industries, subject to the change in International Outsourcing 
Since International Outsourcing makes the respective industry more competitive on world markets, output increases in the relative high skill intensive industry (q X > 0), whereas output of the industry remaining integrated decreases (q Y < 0).
As we know, assuming wage flexibility, high and low skilled labor remain fully employed. However, provided that labor can freely move between the industries, within industry employment effects arise. Taking the total differential of the full employment conditions and substituting for the change in relative wages, labor unit requirements as well as output, we obtain 4 The unambiguity of this result depends strongly on the assumption of a Cobb Douglas production process and the flexible wage set-up. Since the shift toward more low skill intensive production does not hold empirically, this may be a first hint pointing to labor market rigidities. Then, firms would reduce low skill employment which adds to unemployment (cf. Dluhosch, 2008) . 
Summarizing the Main Findings
Since the relative high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill intensive production block, it needs less low skilled labor and thus, faces a reduction in unit costs. Assuming an economy facing given world prices, the additional return is used to pay a wage premium for high skilled labor. Thus, with labor assumed to be mobile between the industries, relative wages of the high skilled increase in both industries. Consequently, labor unit requirements of high skilled labor decrease. This implies a skill shift toward more low skilled labor. Since the industry facing International Outsourcing activities gets more competitive on world markets, output increases while output of the other industry (the one keeping its integrated production structure) decreases. All these results have to be considered for the effects on within industries' employment: Since labor moves from the contracting relative low skill intensive to the expanding relative high skill intensive industry, low skill as well as high skill employment increases in the industry with International Outsourcing activities, while it decreases in the industry remaining integrated.
General Equilibrium Effects with Wage Rigidity
After examining general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing with flexible wages, this section considers an empirically more realistic scenario for major European economies. There, powerful unions as well as high social standards induce some kind of wage rigidity for low skilled labor. As employees would not accept wages beneath the margin set by social standards, wages are prevented from adjusting to shocks. Thus, results are likely to differ fundamentally from the flexible wage benchmark model. In order to consider these differences we violate the flexible wage assumption and subject the entire labor market of the economy to a wage floor for low skilled labor. Following Brecher (1974a,b) , labor market inflexibility is modeled with real wages for the low skilled rigid with respect to the numeraire.
The rigid wage, exogenously given in real terms, is specified at a fixed level denoted byw L , the real wage before the respective industry decides to relocate production fragments abroad. Thus, atw L low skilled labor is fully employed but with downward inflexibility of the real wage
To investigate the implications of International Outsourcing with wage rigidity assume again the case that the relative high skill intensive industry relocates its low skill intensive production fragment (φ XL > 0 whereasφ XH =φ YL =φ YH = 0). As we know from (15) and (17) real wages of the low skilled decrease in absolute as well as in relative terms. Thus, the above defined minimum wage (31) is binding, preventing low skilled wages from downward adjustment (ŵ L = 0).
With wage rigidity we have to rewrite (13) and (14) and obtain
as equilibrium conditions. Solving for the percentage change in high skill wages, different results ceteris paribus emerge for the two industries
As Figure 2 shows, International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive production fragment in the relative high skill intensive industry shifts the respective unit cost function horizontally outside. Due to the wage rigidity for the low skilled, wages of the high skilled increase in the same industry but, in a first step, remain unchanged in the relative low skill intensive industry. As we assumed labor to be completely mobile between industries, the high skilled employed in the relative low skill intensive industry would immediately move to the relative high skill intensive industry in order to achieve the wage premium. Thus, the low skill intensive industry would stop production. However, holding to the assumption of incomplete specialization, this is not an equilibrium anymore. Thus, in order to keep production positive, the relative low skill intensive industry is forced to accept the high skill wage premium paid in θ XHφ XL ). Then, however, the relative low skill intensive industry is no longer producing at minimum costs. The only way for the relative low skill intensive industry to remain at the minimum cost level is to reduce output.
Wages and Labor Unit Requirements
Provided that the relative low skill intensive industry has to accept the high skill wage premium, implied by International Outsourcing occurring in the relative high skill intensive industry, and since the wage floor for low skilled labor is binding (ŵ L = 0), the change in relative wages of the high skilled equals the respective absolute change withŵ
Thus, also with a wage floor for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing in the relative high skill intensive industry increases relative wages of the high skilled, however, not as strong as in the flexible wage scenario
since ∆ Θ ≡ θ XH − θ YH < θ XH . Thus, the minimum wage for low skill labor mildens the widening of the wage gap.
For the effects of International Outsourcing on relative labor unit requirements remember (18) - (21) and substitute for the change of relative wages assuming the binding minimum wage (34). Solving for the change in relative labor unit requirements, we obtainâ
Since relative wages of the high skilled increase also with a minimum wage for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing again induces a skill shift towards more low skilled labor in both industries. However, the skill shift is, as the effects on relative wages, not as strong with wage rigidity as with flexible wages.
Output and Employment
In order to achieve the equilibrium pattern of output and employment, call the endowment of the economy with fixed overall factor supplies (L andH) constraining the employment conditions. With the assumption of wage rigidity, we have to rewrite (7) and obtain
considering that unemployment of the low skilled may occur (L ≤ 0). Thus, there is the possibility of low skilled labor being not employed in the X or in the Y industry.
Since high skill wages remain flexible, high skilled labor stays fully utilized
Taking the total differential of the employment conditions (37 and 38), we obtain
as equilibrium condition. Considering the changes in labor unit requirements as well as relative wages, we can solve (39) and (40) forq X andq Y and achievê
as equilibrium output patterns for both industries. Since low skilled labor was fully employed before slicing up the value chain, employment of the low skilled can either remain unchanged or decrease (L ≤ 0). Thus, International Outsourcing increases output in the relative high skill intensive industry and leads to a contraction of the relative low skill intensive one. By contrast to the benchmark-case of flexible wages, the change in output occurring with rigid wages is due to two different forces, one "normal" effect of the International Outsourcing activity as well as an "additional" effect as the low skill intensive industry sets low skilled labor free (L Y ≤ 0), in order to maintain the minimum cost level. Since λ XH > λ YH , the change of low skilled employment decreases the output in the relative low skill intensive industry (Y) by more than it expands output in the relative high skill intensive industry (X) (i.e.
To examine the effects on employment, consider again the change within the industries. Substituting for the change in relative wages, the change in labor unit requirements as well as the change in output, we obtain
as the effects of International Outsourcing on within industries' high skill employment. Provided that high skilled wages stay flexible, the relative low skill intensive industry (Y) again decreases employment of the high skilled (Ĥ Y ≤ 0), whereas the relative high skill intensive industry increases high skilled employment. For the within industries' change in low skill employment we achievê
as the long run equilibrium. Thus, after some painful adjustment processes in the short run, some of the low skilled labor set free in the relative low skill intensive industry (Y) is absorbed by the relative high skill intensive industry (X). However, since not all of the unemployed low skilled can be absorbed at given wages by the relative high skill intensive industry (X), International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive parts in the relative high skill intensive industry increases unemployment of the low skilled as long as we move down the Rybczynski line to find the new equilibrium situation.
Summarizing the Main Findings
Subjecting the labor market of the economy to a rigid wage floor for low skilled labor, International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive part in the relative high skill intensive industry enables the industry to pay a high skill wage premium. However, due to the wage rigidity, high skill wages do not increase in the relative low skill intensive industry in the first step. Thus, since the high skilled in the relative low skill intensive industry would move to the relative high skill intensive one, in order to benefit from the wage premium, the low skill intensive industry would stop production. This is no equilibrium situation holding to the assumption of incomplete specialization. Thus, the relative low skill intensive industry has to accept the high skill wage premium. In order to remain at the minimum level of unit costs, the industry has to reduce output.
Thus, absolute as well as relative wages of the high skilled increase in both industries, however, not as strong as in the flexible wage scenario. Assuming Cobb Douglas production structures, this induces a skill shift in both industries towards more low skilled labor. With wage rigidity, the output pattern depends on two different forces. Since
International Outsourcing increases the competitiveness in the relative high skill intensive industry, the industry expands while the low skill intensive contracts. However, since the relative low skill intensive industry is forced to accept the high skill wage premium paid in the relative high skill intensive industry, there is an additional force constraining the low skill intensive industry. Since the low skilled labor set free by the relative low skill intensive industry can not be completely absorbed by the relative high skill intensive one, we move the Rybczynski line downward, with low skill unemployment increasing until we reach the new equilibrium situation.
Empirical Evidence for Germany
In order to empirically test the theoretical findings stated above, this section provides a micro-econometric panel data analysis investigating the different implications of International Outsourcing that occur when being adopted in a flexible wage industry, or in an industry characterized by a rigid wage floor for low skilled labor instead. Due to small but important differences between the empirical situation and the theoretical assumptions made above, empirical results are expected to differ slightly from the theoretical findings. Thus, the expected empirical outcomes are stressed first, before the section describes the data and the econometric tests in detail.
In order to focus on a long run perspective and to keep the theoretical equilibrium traceable, one crucial assumption imposed was labor being completely mobile between the industries. This, however, is not reflected in the data. Due to personal characteristics like e.g. education or family status, labor is not completely mobile empirically. Thus, painful short run adjustment effects need to be accepted. Given these facts, International
Outsourcing is expected to increase unemployment of the low skilled when taking place in high skill intensive industries, even when wages can adjust. However, when outsourcing takes place in industries with wage rigidity, the increase in unemployment is expected to be more extensive. When Outsourcing takes place in the relative low skill intensive industries, unemployment of the low skilled should not increase since the wage floor is assumed not to be binding. At more aggregated industry levels, like the whole economy or the service industry, we are not able to make any presumptions.
Data and Econometric Methodology
In order to provide empirical evidence for the way wage rigidity affects International
Outsourcing implications, the analysis bases on microeconomic panel data for the German economy between 1991 and 2000. Within a multiple logit model, individual unemployment is regressed on the International Outsourcing activity of the industry the individual's employed in, as well as several variables controlling for observable individual-specific as well as industry-specific characteristics. Therefore, several indices are developed and some of them are very common in use. One of these indices, called the VS-index, is a proxy of imported inputs in production and can be calculated using
(m wt /s wt )·q w jt p jt with q as total inputs from industry w used in industry j, p as production value in industry j, m as total imports and s as the domestic use of goods w. For a descriptive overview of International Outsourcing activities in Germany, measured by the VS-index, and an empirical investigation of often used International Outsourcing indices, see Horgos (2009) . 6 See Moulton (1990) for the necessity to include industry controls in order to account for correlation of errors within groups and thus, to provide spurious regression when estimating the effects of macro-variables on micro-units. the individual's residence, gender, as well as the education of each individual with respect to the international comparable ISCED from UNESCO (1997). 7 In order to perform the required estimations, additional information on the existence of wage rigidity at the industry level is needed. However, since wage rigidity is typically not observable on a more aggregated sectoral bases, there is a need to proxy wage rigidity at the industry level. This, however, is an empirical challenge and thus, may be the reason why there is no empirical evidence for wage rigidities affecting the implication of economic phenomena, like e.g. International Outsourcing activities. In order to generate an indicator denoting if an industry is characterized by a rigid wage structure or not, the analysis follows a similar procedure as in Holden (2004), Goette et al. (2007) , Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) , and Bauer et al. (2007). 8 In order to obtain the information whether an industry is characterized by rigid wages for the low skilled or not, the percentage change of the mean wageŵ it of the low skilled is calculated for each year in each two-digit NACE industry as a first step. Based on the percentage changes, a normalized distribution of the corresponding wage changes per industry-year is generated by adjusting the empirically observed wage changes with the industry specific median and standard deviationŵ
. Afterward, the industry-year specific samples of the empirical distribution need to be calculated.
As the empirical samples and their moments are stochastic and thus burdened with unknown uncertainty, a bootstrap method is used. Thus, we create a distribution of the low skilled wage changes in bootstrapping the empirically observed percentage changes for each industry-year sample. Based on the generated empirical distribution, the number of wage cuts per industry is calculated and, in this regard, the respective probability of a wage cut occurring in this industry is computed. The empirically observed probability of wage cuts needs to be related to a normalized probability of wage cuts (assuming no wage rigidity). Therefore, a notional distribution of the normalized wage cuts is created by adjusting the normalized wage changes with the bootstrapped mean and standard deviationw it ≡ŵ n it sd B + µ B . Based on this notional normalized distribution, the number of wage cuts and the respective probability of these wage cuts occurring per industry are calculated. The notional normalized probability of wage cuts per industry can then be related to the empirically observed probability of wage cuts per industry. If the empirically observed probability of wage cuts per industry is smaller than the notional normalized one, it is assumed that the respective * / ** / *** significant at 10 / 5 / 1 percent industry is characterized by rigid wages for low skilled labor.
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Results
In order to empirically test the effects of wage rigidity on the implications of International Outsourcing activities, (46) is first regressed for the whole economy, differing between all industries and industries with rigid wages for low skilled labor. 10 The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 1. 9 Table 3 in the Appendix provides an overview of the two-digit NACE industries in Germany characterized as rigid-wage industries due to this classification (considering the period 1991-2000). 10 Since it can not be assumed that the individuals exhibit a systematic intercept, but instead, that they are randomly drawn from a binomial distribution, all the models below are tested using a randomeffects logit estimator. Additionally, since the data consists of a huge amount of observations and a comparably small amount of years, the random effects logit model can be assumed to be much more efficient than its fixed effects variant. When regressing the unemployment status on the contemporaneous industries' output, a possible endogeneity problem could be assumed. Therefore, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests are applied to assure that possible endogeneity does not significantly affect the consistency of the estimated coefficients.
As the results show, International Outsourcing (proxied by the VS index) increases the probability of low skilled labor to get unemployed, however, with a z-value of 1.60, not at a statistically significant level. By contrast, when considering that International Outsourcing takes place in industries with wage rigidity for low skilled labor, the probability of getting unemployed due to International Outsourcing activities is twice as high, and in addition, highly statistically significant at a level of 1 percent.
The included control variables also yield a variety of very interesting results. While the output of an industry has only insignificant effects, the individual control variables strongly influence the possibility of an individual getting unemployed on a statistically significant level. The age of an individual, e.g., decreases the probability of getting unemployed slightly, but statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Living in the eastern part of Germany or being female, by contrast, significantly increases the likelihood of getting unemployed. These highly statistically significant effects ensure that the overall model is fitted well with highly significant chi2-values. The model is based on approx. 15,000 individual observations, includes industry, year, and region controls to avoid contemporaneous correlation, and thus, is necessarily representative to derive generalizable results.
When International Outsourcing takes place in the service sector, results also confirm the increasing effect of wage rigidity on unemployment of the low skilled. Considering all service industries, International Outsourcing indeed increases the probability for the low skilled to get unemployed, however, as for the whole economy, not at a statistically significant level. When focusing solely on the service industries characterized by a rigid wage floor for low skilled labor, the effect is nearly twice as intensive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results of the other control variables confirm the above stated findings, as well as the robustness of the model. After providing empirical evidence for more aggregated industry levels, the results presented in Table 2 move the focus on more disaggregated industry levels, the high as well as low skill intensive industries of the manufacturing sector. Considering the above mentioned differences between the theoretical model (adopting a long run perspective) and the empirical methodology (accounting for short run adjustment) the empirical results strongly support the theoretical picture of section 4. If International Outsourcing takes place in high skill intensive industries, the probability for low skilled individuals to get unemployed increases, statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
However, when International Outsourcing takes place in high skill intensive industries characterized by wage rigidity for low skilled labor, the probability of getting unemployed nearly doubles and becomes statistically even more significant with the z-value increasing up to 2.16. The results of the additional control variables do not change compared to the whole economy, however, the gender and the east German dummy variable are outside the statistically significant range. * / ** / *** significant at 10 / 5 / 1 percent When International Outsourcing takes place in the relative low skill intensive industries, the probability for the low skilled to get unemployed decreases, however, not at a statistically significant level. This result, occurring even in industries with wage rigidity, supports the expected results known from the sector bias of International Outsourcing (cf. Arndt, 1997) : Since low skilled labor gains when International
Outsourcing occurs in relative low skill intensive industries, the demand for low skilled labor increases as does employment and wages. Thus, a possible wage floor would not be binding and unemployment would be expected to decrease. The results of the included control variables again confirm the findings. One interesting point to note additionally is that the increasing effect of being a female on the probability of the low skilled to get unemployed is statistically significant, and even much higher, in relative low skill intensive industries compared to the relative high skill intensive ones.
Conclusion
In order to examine general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing, research mostly assumes a flexible wage set-up. However, in major European economies, labor markets are characterized by powerful unions and high social standards, inducing an implicit wage rigidity for low skilled labor. While only few contributions theoretically examining International Outsourcing effects within a rigid-wage economy emerged recently, there is still no empirical evidence which support these findings. This paper contributes to fill this gap.
Therefore, general equilibrium effects of International Outsourcing are formally examined by employing a modern duality approach. Assuming a binding wage floor for low skilled labor, results differ fundamentally from the flexible wage scenario: With
International Outsourcing of the low skill intensive production block in the relative high skill intensive industry, real wages of the high skilled increase in the outsourcing industry while ceteris paribus not changing in the relative low skill intensive industry.
However, with labor completely mobile between industries, the relative low skill intensive industry had to quit production since all high skilled would move to the skill intensive industry. Thus, for staying afloat, the relative low skill intensive industry is forced to accept the high skill wage premium and thus, to decrease output. Therefore, This contribution tries not to explain the main causes for unemployment in major European economies. Instead, the paper highlights the importance of labor market institutions to gain or lose from a non-stoppable economic process, International Outsourcing. Policy makers can either stand for more flexibility, and accept a larger wage gap, or for more rigid labor markets, and buying a decrease in the wage gap dearly with low skilled unemployment. Thus, in terms of unemployment, not International Outsourcing but inflexible labor market institutions should instead be blamed for harming low skilled labor.
Appendix: Wage Rigidity at the 2-digit NACE Industry Level 
